SUEKI Fumihiko
THE CONCEPT OF hongaku û· (innate enlightenment), first encountered in the Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun Øñ|=Ç [Awakening of Faith] , underwent centuries of profound development in China and Japan. The most radical expression of this doctrinal tradition is found in the medieval Japanese Tendai school. The term "hongaku thought" (hongaku shisõ û·"`) can be applied either broadly to refer to all teachings on innate enlightenment, or narrowly to refer only to the development of the concept within the Tendai tradition; in this paper I will use the narrower meaning.
The academic study of hongaku in modern Japan was begun by Shimaji Daitõ and subsequently carried on by Hazama Jikõ and Tamura Yoshirõ.
1 In 1973 Tamura and three other scholars published a critical, annotated edition of many hongaku texts (TADA et al.) . This work opened the way for further research and helped to popularize studies into hongaku teachings in Japan.
Tamura identifies world-affirmation (genjitsu kõtei ê× ‡Ï)as one of the main characteristics of hongaku thought, and praises the teachings as the "climax" of Buddhist philosophy.
2 He nevertheless points out a basic weakness in the hongaku teachings: their tendency to denigrate the importance of religious practice, a tendency often identi³ed as one of the causes of moral corruption in the Buddhist order. As a result many of the new traditions of Kamakura Buddhism criticized hongaku teachings even as they were inµuenced by it.
After Tamura, two major trends emerged in the academic study of the hongaku teachings: Hakamaya Noriaki's criticism of hongaku thought and the late Kuroda Toshio's (1926 Toshio's ( -1993 theory of the Buddhist establishment as an exoteric-esoteric system (kenmitsu taisei ßO¿£).
Hakamaya's 1989 book Hongaku shisõ hihan û·"`−| [A critique of hongaku thought] caused a sensation, for it presented a radical challenge to views widely accepted by Buddhist scholars. 3 Hakamaya uses the term hongaku in a very broad sense to include any syncretistic tendency involving Buddhism and the indigenous traditions of India, China, and Japan. 4 Although his interpretation is too broad to be of any real use in the discussion of hongaku in Japanese Tendai, Hakamaya nevertheless views medieval Tendai positions as typical examples of hongaku thought. His criticisms focus on two concerns.
First, HAKAMAYA claims that hongaku thought can be employed to justify discrimination under the guise of equality (1989, pp. 134-58) . Since, according to the hongaku teachings, everything in the world is a manifestation of enlightenment, social discrimination too can be rationalized away as an expression of truth. Second, Hakamaya criticizes hongaku teachings as "pseudo-Buddhism." His position is closely related to that of his colleague, MATSUMOTO Shirõ (1989) , who links the concept of tath"gatagarbha (Buddha nature) with the non-Buddhist belief in a substantive substrate underlying the phenomenal world. Hongaku thought having developed from the tath"gatagarbha teachings, this criticism applies to the notion of innate enlightenment as well. Both Hakamaya and Matsumoto began their studies in the field of Tibetan Buddhism, and have applied Geluk school criticisms of tath"gatagarbha thought to the hongaku teachings.
5
Hakamaya's criticisms have provided a valuable and necessary stimulus for Japanese Buddhist scholars, who tend to avoid discussions of essential issues and uncritically adhere to conventional interpretations. He has oversimplified the situation, however, as will become clear in the following consideration of hongaku thought and its position in the history of Buddhist philosophy.
The Marxist historian Kuroda Toshio considered hongaku thought from a slightly different perspective. 6 The academic consensus at the time Kuroda wrote saw Kamakura Buddhism as the new Buddhist mainstream of the Kamakura period, arising from the common people's efforts to overthrow the previous political structure. 7 Kuroda, however, asserted that during the Kamakura period the new Buddhist schools remained marginal, and that establishment Buddhism maintained its mainstream position by developing into what Kuroda calls kenmitsu Buddhism (because it combined the exoteric Kengyõ and esoteric Mikkyõ teachings). Hongaku thought was the ideology of this establishment and reµected the views of the ruling classes. Thus Kuroda portrayed hongaku thought in a negative manner, though he recognized its historical signi³cance.
The concerns raised by Hakamaya and Kuroda are valid, and have made it difficult to share Tamura's view of hongaku thought as the climax of Buddhist philosophy. This negative evaluation, however, should not deter us from investigating the hongaku tradition-indeed, the position of hongaku thought as the ideology of the establishment and its profound influence upon Japanese culture make it, if anything, even more important as an object of study.
We must thus enter a new stage of hongaku research. The first step in this must be textual studies. The material already published represents but a small fraction of the extant manuscripts, and much of it has not been critically edited. In addition, many of the manuscripts are written in sõsho u-, a cursive style of calligraphy that is dif³cult for the uninitiated to decipher, so that cooperation with specialists who can read such manuscripts is vital. Second, the contents of the . Recent textual studies have proven that it was not written by Genshin but have yet to demonstrate convincingly either who wrote it or when it was composed. It most probably dates from the late Heian or early Kamakura period (late twelfth or early thirteenth century).
8
As mentioned above, one of the main characteristics of hongaku thought is its absolute af³rmation of the phenomenal world. This position is, however, quite similar to the basic Mah"y"na doctrine that "de³lements themselves are identical to enlightenment" (bonnõ soku bodai˜ñ"¬Ø) or "sa½s"ra is identical to nirv"«a" (shõji soku nehań '"Ãae). What is the difference between the position of ordinary Mah"y"na Buddhists and that of the advocates of hongaku thought with regard to this issue? This question will be analyzed in the ³rst section below.
Another issue concerns whether or not advocates of innate enlightenment thought actually advocated the abandonment of practice. We will demonstrate that hongaku thought does indeed include an element of praxis, and clarify how this aspect related to the worldaf³rmation of the hongaku advocates.
The Problem of Self-Consistency
As noted above, statements such as "de³lements themselves are identical to enlightenment" and "sa½s"ra is identical to nirv"«a" are common in Mah"y"na Buddhism. But what do they actually mean? If the de³lements are enlightenment, is practice necessary in order to attain enlightenment? If sa½s"ra is nirv"«a, is practice necessary in order to realize nirv"«a?
In Mah"y"na Buddhism the answer in both cases is that practice is necessar y. The phrase bonnõ soku bodai does not mean that the de³lements are, just as they are, enlightenment. Their identity is not at the phenomenal level but at the level of essence.
9 A clearer restatement of the phrase would be, "The de³lements are in essence identical to enlightenment." When one realizes enlightenment, the identi³cation of the de³lements and enlightenment becomes a fact; from the perspective of a Buddha, all differences disappear and everything becomes equal. Such enlightenment can only be realized through practice. This argument can be summarized in the following way: The statement shõji soku nehan can be explained in a similar fashion.
The hongaku tradition reversed this situation, insisting that the identity exists not only on the level of essence but also on that of phenomena. De³lements are themselves enlightenment, a fact that does not depend on whether a person has or has not practiced and attained enlightenment. This argument leads to the hongaku tradition's position of no-practice.
A more sophisticated argument for no-practice is found in the Kotogaki. It is based on what I call the "principle of self-consistency" (jiko-dõitsusei À÷|s §; SUEKI 1993, p. 328) . The nature of a being does not change--an ordinar y person is an ordinar y person, a denizen of hell is a denizen of hell. To express it as a formula: "A is A and nothing other than A." This, according to the Kotogaki, is what is signified by enlightenment, Buddhahood, and so forth.
Consider, for example, the section entitled "The Realization of Buddhahood by Trees and Grasses" (Sõmoku jõbutsu no koto u…¨[ îª; TADA et al. 1973, pp. 166-67) . The realization of Buddhahood by grasses and trees was a popular Tendai doctrine ³rst discussed in Japan during the early Heian period (SUEKI 1995) . The Kotogaki says, "Our school maintains that grasses and trees realize Buddhahood because of the nonduality of the subject and its environment (eshõ funi S±#Ì)." However, after presenting the standard view of the Japanese Tendai school, the Kotogaki criticizes it as commonplace and argues, "Our opinion is that grasses and trees do not realize Buddhahood; this is a profound idea."
Grasses and trees are the environment (ehõ S³), and sentient beings are the subjects (shõbõ ±³). The environment remains the environment as it manifests the merits of the ten realms. Subjects remain subjects even as they manifest the merits of subjects (of the ten realms). If grasses and trees attain Buddhahood, the environment of the whole world would decrease, but in fact there is no decrease in the environment. Thus the opinion that grasses and trees realize Buddhahood is super³cial, even though it appears to be an excellent teaching.
( TADA et al. 1973, p. 167) Grasses and trees are nothing but grasses and trees; they do not change into Buddhas or anything else. They can manifest all the merits that they have just as grasses and trees. The situation is similar to that of subjects, that is, the beings of the ten realms. The discussion in the Kotogaki continues as follows:
The situation is similar in the case of realization of Buddhahood by the hell-dwellers, hungry ghosts, and so forth all the way up to the bodhisattvas…. The ten realms of this world are eternal without any change at all; grasses are eternal, sentient beings are eternal, and the ³ve elements are eternal. Think about this carefully.
( TADA et al. 1973, p. 167) Not only grasses, but sentient beings too do not change into Buddhas. They are self-consistent and eternal just as they are. Similar ideas appear in many parts of the Kotogaki. In the section entitled "Sa½s"ra is Nirv"«a," the common view that nirv"«a is ³xed and immutable is denied. According to the text, "Transient things are eternal and do not cease while they are transient. Distinct beings are eternal and do not cease while they are distinct" (TADA et al. 1973, p.157) . According to the usual view of Buddhism, transience and distinctness cease in the eternal state of enlightenment. The Kotogaki, however, states that the state of transience and difference is itself eternal and without change. Even the cycle of birth and death-sa½s"ra-is eternal just as it is.
In this way, what Tamura called "the absolute af³rmation of the world" is discussed in the Kotogaki on the basis of the principle of selfconsistency. As a result, change in the nature of things is denied. Such a position is so different from standard Buddhist teachings that it is quite understandable why Hakamaya would criticize it as "pseudoBuddhism."
This doctrine is certainly quite radical, but can similar ideas be found in other Buddhist texts? What occurs to us immediately is the emphasis on the everyday world found in Ch'an and Zen Buddhism. For example, the author of the Platform Sðtra of the Sixth Patriarch criticizes the "gradual" practice of Shen-hsiu PD and praises the famous verse of Hui-neng Šô:
The mind is the Bodhi-tree, The body is the mirror-stand. The mirror is originally clean and pure, Where can it be obscured by dust? (YAMPOLSKY 1967, p. 132) Although this verse is said to present the standpoint of "sudden" enlightenment, it actually seems to present a standpoint of no-practice and no-enlightenment similar to that found in hongaku thought. However, the verse expresses no principle corresponding to the selfconsistency discussed above. Moreover, this verse is paired with another verse:
Bodhi originally has no tree, The mirror also has no stand. Buddha-nature is always clean and pure, Where is there any room for dust? (YAMPOLSKY 1967, p. 132) This verse concerns the same truth as the ³rst. But, whereas the ³rst verse expresses the aspects of af³rmation and difference, the second emphasizes the aspects of negation and equality. It is in terms of both these aspects that sudden enlightenment is explained in Ch'an/Zen Buddhism. In hongaku thought, negation and equality are lost and only af³rmation and difference are af³rmed (Tamura's "absolute af³rmation of this world" and my "principle of self-consistency"). Are there ideas similar to self-consistency in non-Buddhist literature? In my opinion, some of the ideas of Kuo-hsiang »ae (c. 252-312)-a philosopher of the Chin Dynasty who presented his unique philosophy in a commentary on the Chuang-tzu-are similar to those in the Kotogaki. Kuo-hsiang argued that each being has its own inborn nature that cannot be changed. No one knows why his nature is the way it is; each must live in accordance with it.
To make his case, he interpreted certain passages in the Chuang-tzu in ways that differed from their original meaning. An example is the parable of the swallow and the P'eng bird (an extremely large leg-endary bird) in the ³rst chapter of the Chuang-tzu, "Free and Easy Wandering." The P'eng bird could µy from the northern sea to the southern sea, but small birds and insects only laughed in disbelief when they heard of its feats since they themselves could only µy several hundred miles at most. This suggests that small-minded people cannot understand the great person who transcends the everyday world and enjoys vast freedom. According to Kuo-hsiang:
Great birds and small birds have their own natures and live following their own natures. Whether great or small, they are equal in that they live following their own natures. In the case of human beings, the situation is exactly the same. Some are great in nature and some are small in nature. However, they are equal in that they enjoy their lives following their own natures.
( KUO 1973, p. 7 
[Not a literal translation])
Kuo-hsiang's philosophy resembled in some respects the ideology of the contemporary aristocracy, which believed that one's social position was determined when one was born and could not be changed even through strenuous effort. Kuo-hsiang's philosophy thus supported the establishment of his time.
If the philosophy of the Kotogaki is compared with that of Kuohsiang, a number of similarities become evident. Both insist that one's nature is self-consistent and immutable. Kuo-hsiang distorts the ideas of the Chuang-tzu in a way similar to that in which the Kotogaki twists Mah"y"na ideas; Kuo-hsiang expresses the ideology of the SixDynasties aristocracy, while (at least according to Kuroda) hongaku thought reflects the thought of the medieval establishment.
Needless to say, differences exist between the two philosophies. For example, much of Kuo-hsiang's thought focuses on social and political theory, while hongaku thought is religious. Kuo-hsiang uses philosophical terms such as nature (hsing §) and lot (fên _), while the Kotogaki uses Buddhist terms. Such contrasts might help clarify the true character of hongaku thought, although it is beyond the scope of the present paper to develop them any further.
Problems of Practice
As argued above, the principles of self-consistency and absolute worldaf³rmation suggest that neither practice nor enlightenment is necessary. In the section "The Attainment of Wondrous Enlightenment" (Myõgaku jõdõ no koto U·¨Šîª), the Kotogaki states that "wondrous enlightenment is realized in the single instant of mind of the degree of identity in principle" (ri soku ichinen no kokoro 7"sçîD; TADA et al. 1973, p. 158) . "Identity in principle" is the first stage of the "six degrees of identity" of the perfect teaching in Tendai thought:
1 Identity in principle (ri soku 7"): the stage in which one does not yet know of the Buddhist teachings; 2 Verbal identity (myõji soku e°"): the stage in which one hears and understands Buddhist teachings; 3 Identity of meditation and practice (kangyõ soku ?'"): the stage in which one practices meditation and other religious acts to attain enlightenment; 4 Identity of similarity (sõji soku o«"): the stage in which one attains a state similar to true enlightenment; 5 Identity of partial enlightenment (bunshõ soku _ã" or bunshin soku _O"): the stage at which one attains partial enlightenment; 6 Ultimate identity (kukyõ soku Á‚"): the stage at which one realizes ultimate enlightenment.
The passage quoted from the Kotogaki thus indicates that a person can realize ultimate enlightenment at the stage of identity in principle, a stage at which a person would know nothing of Buddhism, let alone practice it. Every moment of consciousness of an ordinary person would thus constitute the realization of ultimate enlightenment. This conclusion is the inevitable result of the principles of self-consistency and absolute world-af³rmation. A new problem thus emerges: If we follow this train of thought, then Buddhism is no longer necessary for realizing enlightenment and the importance of Buddhism is in effect negated. In my opinion, one of the reasons why mainstream Japanese thought shifted so smoothly from an emphasis on Buddhism to a stress on Shinto and Confucianism in the Muromachi and Tokugawa periods was because Buddhism negated its own importance.
The Kotogaki is not consistent on this point, however. In the section "The Attainment of Wondrous Enlightenment," which presents the concept of returning to and becoming one with innate enlightenment (gendõ hongaku B|û·), it is stated that the return to innate enlightenment occurs partially at the stage of verbal identity. From this perspective, enlightenment at the stage of identity of principle is not actual enlightenment but only enlightenment in principle. Actual enlightenment is nothing other than returning to innate enlightenment, and it begins when one hears and understands the teaching of Buddhism.
In addition, the section "The Attainment of Enlightenment with Four Phrases" (Shiku jõdõ no koto vI¨Šîª) criticizes the idea of attaining wondrous enlightenment at the stage of identity in principle as a teaching that is reasonable but not profound. A deeper interpretation, the author claims, is one in which enlightenment is realized through the following four phrases (TADA et al. 1973, pp. 154-55) :
Traces (shaku )) TADA et al. 1973, pp. 179-81) .
Thus from the perspective of religious practice it is usually at the stage of verbal identity that the Kotogaki af³rms the realization of enlightenment. In contrast, orthodox T'ien-t'ai teachings hold that enlightenment occurs at the stage of partial enlightenment, as the name of the stage implies. This is the ³fth of the six stages and is not easy for the ordinary person to attain. The degree of verbal identity is the lowest stage that one can, as a Buddhist, be considered "enlightened."
According to the Kotogaki, enlightenment is realized in a single instant of thought (ichinen sç), at the instant when the truth is ³rst heard and understood. It is realized, in other words, at the moment one enters the stage of verbal identity. This is similar to sudden enlightenment in Zen Buddhism. However, while sudden enlightenment in Zen occurs after a long period of practice, the hongaku position has it taking place the instant one enters Buddhism.
Is "gradual" practice necessar y to attain the ultimate stage of enlightenment once the practitioner has realized the initial stage? Although certain passages in the Kotogaki seem to allow for the gradual realization of enlightenment, the section entitled "The Attainment of Buddhahood in a Single Instant" clearly rejects it: "One need not advance from one stage to another. When one encounters the teaching, one realizes enlightenment" (TADA et al. 1973, p. 180) . Is practice thus meaningless? According to the text, "All practice and good deeds are expedient means after the realization of enlightenment" (p. 180).
This interpretation is similar to the Jõdo Shinshð teaching of the nenbutsu said in gratitude to Amida Buddha after rebirth in the Pure Land has been determined.
Thus the attainment of Buddhahood is considered to be quite easy for ordinary people. This is, nevertheless, much different from the position that practice is unnecessary, as found in other parts of the Kotogaki. Although the stage of verbal identity may seem quite close to the stage of identity in principle, there is in fact a discontinuity between the two levels. In order to be in agreement with Buddhist and religious concepts, the realization of Buddhahood cannot occur at any level earlier than the stage of verbal identity. There is a tension, in other words, between the naturalism of no-practice and the requirement that a practitioner at least hear and understand the teaching. This contradiction in the Kotogaki is one of the major issues in hongaku thought.
The following figure shows the relation between the hongaku notions of naturalism and enlightenment-in-a-single-instant and the Ch'an notions of sudden and gradual enlightenment:
Another term that must be discussed in connection with the hongaku concept of ichinen jõbutsu (realization of Buddhahood in a single instant) is the Pure Land term ichinen nenbutsu. The term ichinen sç has at least three meanings relating to these terms: 1) an instant, or the shortest period of time (Skt. eka-k¤a«a); 2) a single instant of mental activity (Skt. cittop"da), or the slightest activity of the mind; and 3) a single recitation of the nenbutsu (SUEKI 1978) . The hongaku teachings employ the second meaning, while Pure Land Buddhism uses both the second and the third. Hõnen and several of his disciples maintained that even a single recitation would enable one to be reborn in the Pure Land (ichinen-gi sç-). Because this teaching seemed so radical, it was used by establishment Buddhism as a reason for persecuting the Pure Land followers, leading Hõnen to expel Gyõkð 'W, the most adamant exponent of this interpretation. However, Kõsai a», another advocate of ichinen-gi, remained one of Hõnen's chief disciples. Shinran too was strongly inµuenced by the teaching.
Hõnen stressed the third meaning of ichinen (a single recitation of the nenbutsu), while Kõsai employed it in the second sense (a single
